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experiment FPGA already includes fault tolerant properties against radiation and its 
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The harsh space environment represents a challenge for the design and 
implementation of computer systems for space applications since radiation can cause an 
entire system to fail. The basic requirements for space computers are: low power 
consumption, minimum volume and mass, without sacrificing overall performance. In 
addition, space computers must exhibit high reliability and should be able to tolerate 
different kinds of faults. Mandatory properties of space systems are: Fault tolerance, 
expandability, on-line recovery, and ease of testing and verification. The FPGAs have 
proved to be a solution for the implementation of computer systems for space. 
The purpose of the CFTP program is to provide a platform for the implementation 
and verification of designs for space applications. The principal components of the CFTP 
board are two XQVR600 -4CB Xilinx FPGAs, one programmed as the Control FPGA 
(X1) and the other as the experiment FPGA (X2). 
The objective of this work was to make the Control FPGA of the CFTP fault 
tolerant. In order to accomplish this objective there are a series of fault tolerant 
techniques applicable to FPGAs that range from the Radiation Hardening of the FPGA to 
the N-Modular Redundancy. 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) was selected since it is a technique well 
developed and understood and it is the only way to protect the configuration bits stored in 
the FPGA against Single Event Upsets (SEUs). Three Fault Tolerant Control Unit 
(FTX1) designs were proposed: 3PFTX1, BFTX1 and MFTX1. All of these 
implementations are based on the TMR with some variations. 
The 3PFTX1 is the first design proposed. It is based on the complete TMR of the 
original Control Unit (X1). In theory it is the best way to implement a FTX1. From inputs 
to outputs all the resources being utilized by X1 are replicated including the configuration 
bits. This provides overall protection to X1 against SEUs. 
 xviii
The restriction with the implementation of 3PFTX1 is that there are no pins 
available for the triplication of its input and output signals. This limitation makes it 
impossible to implement 3PFTX1 given that in order to implement complete TMR three 
different data paths are required starting from the inputs and with just one pin per signal 
this is impractical. A change of the CFTP hardware is required for the correct 
implementation of 3PFTX1. 
With this limitation in mind a different FTX1 was proposed. BFTX1 is based on 
the triplication of instances of X1 components declared in the top level module. Although 
BFTX1 represents a partial implementation of TMR in the original X1, this design 
increases the reliability of X1 with no detriment of its functionality and performance. 
The problem with this design is that since partial TMR is implemented, there are 
single points of failure in the design. These points of failure are Input/Output Blocks 
(IOBs), single majority voters and the processes that take place inside the top level 
module.  
The analysis of the synthesis reports from the Xilinx ISE design tools of BFTX1 
shows that some automatic optimization was occurring. The hypothesis was that since the 
instance of a component is being triplicated (three instances per component) the Xilinx 
tools are smart enough to detect this fact and optimize the design by deleting or replacing 
the redundant resources. 
To investigate this hypothesis a third FTX1 approach was proposed. MFTX1 is 
based on the triplication of components before being instantiated inside top level. With 
this implementation the same single points of failure present in BFTX1 are also present 
here. 
The analysis of the synthesis reports of MFTX1 shown that the amount of 
resources utilized in BFTX1 and MFX1 are pretty much the same. This result discarded 
the hypothesis but other questions emerged. The optimization of resources occurs in both 




instances but a consequence of the design of the original components of X1. Therefore, 
the TMR in BFTX1 and MFTX1 is implemented properly but the components being 
replicated are the already simplified ones. 
The best way to test the FTX1 designs is to expose the CFTP board to radiation 
but this option was not available at the time of development of this work. Limitations in 
hardware made impossible the implementation of a means for the injection of errors and 
scrubbing of FTX1. Instead, manual injection of errors (through the modification of the 
outputs one of the redundant modules) was used. This demonstrated the correct 
implementation of the FTX1 designs. 
The automatic and uncontrolled optimization produced by the Xilinx tools does 
not degrade the functionality and performance of the original X1 and the FTX1 
implementations. 
TMR excels as the Fault Tolerant technique to implement a FTX1 within an 
FPGA. The hardware limitations could not be fixed since this work was based on the 
already implemented and functional X1. Modifications to the original hardware of the 
CFTP board and more specifically, the utilization of an FPGA with a package with more 
pins could have solved the problem. 
An analysis of the amount of resources utilized by the FTX1 designs, the 
correctness of their functionality and the manual injection of errors were used to 
determine the feasibility of the use of TMR in an FPGA for the implementation of a Fault 
Tolerant Control FPGA. Further radiation testing is required in the different FTX1 



























Radiation effects in space on electronics are inevitable, but military and space 
applications working in that environment require high reliability at the lowest possible 
price. One solution to achieve this goal is the use of Application Specific Integrated 
Circuits (ASIC) but the cost of this solution and the time of production are large. A better 
approach is the use of Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) because of their 
commercialization, flexibility, field programmability, reliability, and reconfiguration on 
the fly. Every system depends on a Control Unit that realizes functions like the 
interfacing with the outer world, configuration and verification of other components, and 
space systems are not the exception; these systems require that every component be fault 
tolerant. A fair question to ask at this point is how can FPGAs be used as control units for 
space applications in such a way that performance, reliability and low cost come 
together? What should be considered to design and implement a Fault Tolerant Control 
Unit in an FPGA? What kind of design should it be? How much room do we need in an 
FPGA to realize the implementation? 
Now days there is a deep understanding about the challenges and risks that exist 
when we take electronics to space. The necessity of expensive and sophisticated satellites 
for communications, weather, military applications, etc. has pushed the study of space 
radiation not just to the knowledge of its effects but to finding effective and efficient 
solutions to the use of electronics in space applications. One solution involves the design 
and manufacturing of ASICs with the appropriate characteristics to survive in space. This 
approach implies high investments in the development of electronics that are used for few 
critical applications, and even this fact does not certify that the equipment is going to 
survive to that environment. Instead of the use of ASICs, FPGAs have become an 
effective option to achieve high reliability at low cost; useful properties are derived from 
its field programmability, reconfiguration on the fly, and commercialization. 
The use of an FPGA by itself does not represent a Fault Tolerant device, but it can 
be configured to act as one. Space systems can be designed in different ways depending 
on their purpose, but they will always require the implementation of a Control Unit. A 
2Fault Tolerant Control Unit is required to ensure that even when other components of the 
system experience errors, the overall system will continue operating and will recover 
after a reasonable period of time. The area of interest of this work is focused on the 
design, implementation and testing of a Fault Tolerant Control FPGA (FTX1) for the 
Configurable Fault Tolerant Processor (CFTP) board using a Triple Modular Redundancy 
(TMR) approach. This CFTP board consists of: Control Virtex-I FPGA (X1), 
Experimental Virtex-I FPGA (X2), PC/104 bus for communication and interfacing with 
the outer world, EEPROM for booting the system, Flash Memory to store the 
configuration of experiments to be loaded in X2, and SRAM memory to be used by the 
experiments running in X2.  
A. COMPUTER SYSTEMS FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS 
Space computer systems impose design constraints that are much more difficult to 
meet than do commercial systems. A space computer is designed to execute specific tasks 
with a minimum of supervision. It has to operate properly for long periods of time 
without human intervention or repair in a harsh environment. Reference [10] mentions 
the problems with using Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) parts instead of Application 
Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) in a way that low cost, high functionality and 
performance can be achieved without sacrificing the high reliability requirements for 
space applications. In part this is possible due to the advance in technology of 
commercial parts but since they are not manufactured assuming that they will be use in 
space their resistance against radiation is poor. 
The basic requirements for space computers are: low power consumption, 
minimum volume and mass without sacrificing overall performance. In addition, space 
computers must exhibit high reliability and should be able to tolerate different kinds of 
faults. Mandatory properties of space systems are: fault tolerance, expandability, on-line 
recovery and ease of testing and verification [1].  
Fault tolerance is an important property of space computers since it has an 
intimate relation with computer reliability. It assures proper operation during critical 
missions and avoids maintenance during periods of deployment. Space applications 
require computer systems that provide continuous service in spite of hardware and  
 
3software faults. Depending on the system, the fault tolerant techniques used can differ; 
but in general the most important Fault Tolerant Techniques applicable to space 
computers are as follows. 
1. N-Modular Redundancy 
Because of the new technologies developed using semiconductors and its current 
low cost, the physical replication of hardware has become the most common form of 
redundancy used in digital systems today. There are three basic forms of hardware 
redundancy: 
Passive redundancy hides the occurrence of faults and prevents the faults from 
resulting in errors using fault masking. Passive approaches are designed to achieve fault 
tolerance without requiring any action on the part of the system or an operator. 
Active redundancy achieves fault tolerance by detecting the existence of faults 
and performing some action to remove the faulty hardware from the system. Active 
hardware redundancy uses fault detection, fault location and fault recovery in an attempt 
to achieve fault tolerance. 
Hybrid redundancy is a combination of active and passive redundancy, using fault 
masking to prevent erroneous results from being generated and fault detection, fault 
location and fault recovery to improve fault tolerance by removing faulty hardware and 
replacing it with spares.  
The NMR technique seems to be expensive and in some ways inconvenient but 
one important thing to notice is that a really reliable system can be implemented just by 
using a group of not-so-reliable components to be sure that at least a majority will do the 
work in spite of faults of others. NMR structure uses these replicated components running 
identical functions and a restoring organ, which restores reliable information at its output 
from unreliable information at its inputs.  
The biggest weakness of NMR is the majority voter. If an error occurs in the voter 
or the redundancy is exhausted, then the NMR system fails. In order to overcome this 
difficulty, several methods have been proposed. 
4Error detectors can be associated with each redundant modular unit, to stop the 
unit in case that a fault is detected in it. 
Built-in self-test (BIST) is employed to enhance testability of the redundant 
systems during normal operation, but during the testing, the operation of the redundant 
systems is interrupted.  
Concurrent error detection (CED) is used to build a self-checking fault-tolerant 
system. It consists of a NMR structure and an extra error indicating circuit (EEIC) which 
monitors the outputs of all the redundant modules and itself to detect errors. The 
disadvantage of this system is that it is difficult for the EEIC to distinguish whether a 
redundant module or itself is faulty. The EEIC is similar to the majority voter of a NMR 
system but has the additional property of self-verification. 
2.  N-Version Programming (NVP) 
It is true that software does not break as hardware does, but instead, software 
faults are the result of incorrect software design or coding mistakes. The equivalent of 
NMR in the software scheme is the N-Version programming, and as expected, it consists 
of N software modules with a voter. One important characteristic of these modules is that 
each one must be designed and coded by a separate group of programmers. Each group 
designs the software from the same set of specifications such that each of the N modules 
performs the same function. Therefore, when a fault occurs, the fault either does not 
occur in all modules or it occurs differently in each module, so that the results generated 
by the modules will differ.  
The importance of software fault tolerance is easy to see. If we design a 
microprocessor-based system to be fault tolerant using a NMR configuration, the 
hardware redundancy is of little use if a single software fault can disable all of the 
redundant processors.  
The NVP presents some defects. First, software designers tend to make similar 
mistakes. Second, the N versions of a program are still developed from a common 
specification, so the N-version approach will not allow the detection of specification 
mistakes. Therefore, there is no guarantee that two completely independent versions of a 
program will not have identical faults. 
5Different combinations of the fault tolerance techniques mentioned above can be 
exploited for the implementation of space systems. A well designed system is resistant to 
faults, so the probability of having only one fault in the systems is higher than having two 
or more faults. Reference [32] is a good review of the techniques explained in this 
section. 
3. Error Coding Techniques 
Error Coding Techniques are based on the relationship between the function 
implemented by a system, its inputs and some special property of the outputs that are 
verified by a checker module. If the output is not the expected one in response to a 
specific input then the system indicates an error. Depending on the error coding technique 
employed, the characteristics of the outputs being verified are different, these properties 
can be the parity of the output, transition count, number of ones and zeros on the signal, 
etc. 
A property or error coding techniques is that they are only capable of detecting 
one or as much two errors in the system with limited capability to locate and correct 
them. The process of correction is carried on by a higher level module. The only 
contribution of the error coding techniques is the indication of existence of the error and 
even then some types of errors can pass undetected by error coding techniques. 
B. SPACE ENVIRONMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON ELECTRONICS  
Space is a dynamic and harsh environment of great complexity that needs to be 
well understood in order to design reliable electronics for space applications. Space is not 
a perfect vacuum; instead, it contains particles charged with energy.  
The environment of interest for this work is the near-Earth space, i.e., from the 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) to the Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). The events that occur 
in this environment are affected by the conditions of the Earth itself and its interaction 
with the Sun. Some factors that affect this environment include neutral atoms, gases 
(plasma), energized particles, radiation and electromagnetic fields. These components are 
not constant and form a part of the dynamism of the near-Earth environment and vary 
with the position in orbit (e.g., altitude, latitude and longitude), the hour, time of the year, 
activity of the sun and cosmic rays.  
 
61. Space Environment 
Energetic particles that form the ionizing radiation can penetrate the external 
surface of space devices (spacecraft, satellites). The amount of energy required to 
penetrate the surface of a device varies with the type of particle, for electrons, this  
energy is typically above 100keV, while for protons and other ions this is above 1MeV. 
Neutrons, gamma-rays and X-rays can also be considered energetic particles [33].  
The ionizing radiation particles can be divided in three groups depending on its 
source of radiation (see Table 1):  
• Van Allen belts particles 
• Cosmic rays. 
• Solar flare particles. 
a. Van Allen Belts 
The Van Allen Belts are a tori of energetic charged particles trapped by 
the Earth's magnetic field as shown in Figure 1. There are two belts, the inner belt formed 
by trapped protons (peak intensity at about 3000 kilometers from Earth's surface) and the 
outer one formed by electrons (peak intensity from about 12,000 to 22,000 kilometers 
from the surface) with an area of high particle density (South Atlantic Anomaly) due to 
the displacement of Earth’s magnetic field dipoles from the Earth’s center. Temporal 
radiation belts are formed between the inner and outer belts when interplanetary shock 
waves (cosmic rays and solar flares) hit the magnetosphere [2].  
The source of the Van Allen belts particles are the acceleration of lower 
energy particles by magnetic storm activity and collisions of cosmic rays with 
atmospheric particles, representing the most important source of energetic particles in the 
inner belt. The electrons in the outer belt are quite dynamic and their density is much 
more variable than the protons of the inner belt. The charge and intensity of electrons is 
affected by solar winds and the interplanetary magnetic fields [6]. 
b. Cosmic Rays 
Cosmic Rays are high energy charged particles coming from outside the 
solar system that travel at almost the speed of light (Figure 2). Because cosmic rays are 
electrically charged they suffer deflection by magnetic fields and it is impossible to 
determine their exact origin and direction. Most cosmic rays are the nuclei of atoms from 
7the lightest to the heaviest elements in the periodic table. Cosmic rays also include high 
energy electrons, protons and energetic heavy ions which can deposit significant amounts 
of energy in sensitive volumes on space devices and cause problems [6]. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Van Allen Radiation Belts (From Ref. [2]) 
 
c. Solar Flares 
Solar flares are sudden emissions of optical, UV and X-radiation from an 
energetic event on the Sun and occur when magnetic energy that has built up in the solar 
atmosphere is suddenly released. In this complex process, protons and heavy ions are 
liberated and travel close to the speed of light [6]. 
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Figure 2.   Heliosphere  (From Ref. [3]) 
 
Radiation Source Particle Types Primary Effects in Devices 
Electrons Ionization damage Trapped radiation 




High-energy charged particles Single-event effects (SEEs) 
Electrons Ionization damage 
Protons  Ionization damage; SEE in 





Table 1. Radiation Effects (From Ref. [5]) 
 
2. Radiation Effects 
The key word for electronics for space applications is “radiation.” Radiation is the 
emission of waves or particles charged with energy. The sources of radiation described 
above and the particles that launch to space are the principal concerns for the design 
cycle since each type of particle has specific effects on electronics (Figure 3). The 
amount of energy absorbed by the device defines the total effects on it. The energy 
9absorbed turns into electrons and those electrons into charge. The absorption depends on 
several factors such as the time of exposure to the energized particles, the density of the 
device being exposed, the mass of the incoming particles, the cross section of the device 
and the emission rate of particles from the source. The units of absorption of ionizing 
radiation are Rads. 
  
 
Figure 3.   Radiation Effects on Electronics (From Ref. [4]) 
 
Essentially radiation can cause two things to electronic devices:  
• Remove or ionize electrons from the atoms (Ionizing effects). 
• Move or displace atoms in the semiconductors (Displacement Damage). 
Ionization effects are caused by charged particles (mostly electrons) and their 
effects are usually transient, creating glitches and soft errors, but can lead to destruction 
of the device if they trigger other damage mechanisms like latchup [6]. 
Displacement damage is caused by neutrons, protons and heavy ions. These 
particles change the arrangement of the atoms in the lattice causing permanent damage.  
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More specifically, radiation effects can be categorized in: 
• Total Ionizing Dose. 
• Dose Rate Upset and Latchup. 
• Displacement Damage. 
• Single Even Effects. 
a. Total Ionizing Dose (TID) 
The accumulative radiation over time (TID) is the factor that usually limits 
the operational lifetime of electronics in space. As the dose accumulates it causes changes 
on the operational parameters of electronic components outside of their normal range 
causing the circuit to cease proper functioning. The operational parameters that suffer 
from total dose are voltage threshold shifts, increased device leakage, power 
consumption, speed degradation, etc. Total dose greater than 5000 rads delivered to 
silicon-based devices in seconds to minutes will cause long-term degradation [6]. The 
total accumulated dose depends on orbit altitude, orientation, and time. 
b. Dose Rate Upset and Latchup 
When electronics are exposed to high amounts of radiation, ionization 
occurs over a short period of time (20 to 50 ns) causing large photocurrents [54]. As a 
result of these photocurrents, circuits may exhibit logic-state upset, and the photocurrents 
can also trigger destructive latch-up or metal burnout. 
c. Displacement Damage 
Displacement damage is a cumulative effect caused by prolonged 
exposure to radiation. It is caused by relatively low-energy atomic particles, as they slow 
and nearly come to rest. These particles knock lattice atoms out of their locations, 
creating defects in the crystal structure, which appear as low points in the electrical 
potential. These points trap conduction electrons, increasing the resistance of the device. 
Displacement damage is due to cumulative long-term non-ionizing damage from protons 
of all energies, electrons with energies above 150 KeV and neutrons. Displacement 
damage degrades minority carrier lifetime; a typical effect would be degradation of gain 




d. Single Event Effects 
Single Event Effects, as its name describes, are changes in the parameters 
of electronic devices due to a single energized particle. Single event effects can be 
classified in three different categories:  
Single Event Upsets (SEUs): Basically this is the change of logic state of 
an electronic device caused by a particle passing through it. SEUs are transient soft 
errors, and are non-destructive. Afterward, the device may be re-written into the intended 
state and continue normal operation. SEUs are more evident in memory modules causing 
flips on bits of storage data. A deviation of SEUs is multiple-bit SEUs in which a single 
particle can cause simultaneous errors flipping more that one bit at a time. The worst 
SEU that can occur is the single-event functional interruption (SEFI) in which a SEU 
occurs in the device's control circuitry and places the device into an undefined state. The 
SEFI halts normal operations, and requires a power reset to recover [7]. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Single Event Effects (From Ref. [7]) 
 
Single Event Latchups (SELs): Is a condition in which the device is 




are considered hard errors and are potentially destructive. A SEL can be cleared by 
turning off the device. SELs are strongly temperature dependent: the threshold for 
latchup decreases at high temperature, and the cross section increases as well [8].  
Single Event Burnouts (SEBs): Is a condition in which the current through 
the device is not limited. SEBs cause the device to fail permanently and its susceptibility 
has been shown to decrease with increasing temperature [8]. 
C. RAD HARDENING OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 
Space systems are exposed to radiation than can reduce or end the useful lifetime 
of their electronic components. In consequence, electronics for space applications must 
have a means to protect themselves against the effects of radiation. The source of 
radiation may be energetic particles from the Van Allen belts, galactic cosmic rays or 
solar flares. In addition to the natural sources of radiation mentioned above, satellites 
may be exposed to bursts of radiation coming from human produced nuclear explosions.  
The amount of radiation that a system needs to be able to resist depends on its 
location in orbit. At LEO the total radiation dose on an electronic component can be few 
kilorads, while inside the Van Allen belts the level of radiation can increase to several 
hundred kilorads [5].  
1. Radiation-Hardening Techniques 
The objective of radiation hardening techniques is to increase the capability of 
electronic components to handle specific radiation levels. These techniques can be 
described in two categories: physical design techniques and circuit design (logic) 
techniques [6].  
a. Physical Techniques 
The physical Rad Hard techniques are concerned with the layout of the 
device. The first approach is the Silicon On Insulator (SOI) technique in which the 
electronic devices are manufactured on insulating substrates instead of just a silicon 
wafer. Very thin layers of oxide are used to form the insulator of the devices and regions 
between the transistors in order to limit the parasitic current. The trade off is the increase 
on manufacture complexity since thin layers are more difficult to deal with and one 
imperfection can mess up the entire device. Therefore, the temperature of manufacture is 
limited by the level of temperature that the thin oxides can resist before loosing its 
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properties. A similar approach to SOI is the use of Guardbands; these are heavily-doped 
regions formed by ion implantation that effectively shuts off radiation-induced parasitic 
leakage paths [54].  
The small dimensions of modern electronics make them more susceptible 
to radiation effects. Therefore, the use of oversized transistors can be implemented in 
order to improve SEE immunity [54]. 
If it is not possible to change the manufacturing process, an alternative 
approach is to modify the package of the device so it can provide a protecting shield 
against radioation.  
The material of the wafer (Normally Silicon) can be changed to one with 
higher activation energy and bandgap levels, so the energetic particles of radiation do not 
induce enough energy in the substrate to produce parasitic currents and changes in the 
electrical properties of transistors. Materials being investigated are silicon carbide and 
gallium nitride. 
Physical Radiation Hardening Techniques are based on changes in the 
layout of the device resulting in reduction of the performance and increase of the area of 
the electronic components. The challenge is to find the best results between the radiation 
hardening of the device and its efficiency and reliability.  
b. Logical Techniques 
Instead of changing the design of the device at the fabrication level, the 
radiation hardening can be achieved by changing the properties of the systems where the 
electronic components are used. 
The use of a scrubber circuit can prevent SEE effects by reading 
periodically the contents of memory and doing verification and correction through Error 
Detection And Correction (EDAC) algorithms.   
A common approach is the use of n-redundant components in hardware 
and/or software with each one independent of the others. In this way, the computations 
are executed independently by the different redundant components and the result is 
compared to determine the correct answer. The disadvantage is the required use of n- 
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versions of the same component and the logic to vote their outputs, causing an increment 
in the overall area of the system and the power consumption but with the advantage of 
self-correction of the system. 
A fourth approach is the use of a Watchdog Timer that performs a hard 
reset of the system if it is not able to verify that the system is working properly.  
2. Performance Implications 
The challenge on designing radiation hardening electronics is to do it in such a 
way that the Rad Hard version has a comparable performance with its unhardened 
counterpart. Since the first parameter to be affected is the overall area of the device, the 
performance of the Rad Hard version is reduced. A second implication is the power 
consumption since in the Rad Hard version either bigger transistors or redundant copies 
of the same circuit are utilized.  
D. CFTP PROGRAM 
The CFTP program at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) was conceived to 
investigate the applicability of Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) FPGAs in the design 
and development of reliable computer systems for space applications, to provide 
reliability, re-programmability, flexibility and low cost to space applications, and the 
implementation and verification of designs for space applications. Radiation effects in 
space on electronics are inevitable, but military and space applications working in that 
environment require high reliability. One solution to achieve this goal is the use of 
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) specifically designed to resist the harsh 
space environment but the cost and the time of production of this approach are high. An 
approach that has been investigated is the use of FPGAs that, although they do not have 
the ability to prevent SEUs and other radiation effects, are able to mask the faults by the 
means of reconfiguration. This property not only provides a space system with the always 
required Fault Tolerance capability, it additionally provides flexibility to change the 
design of the circuit that has been implemented in the FPGA and even to implement an 
entirely new circuit. The CFTP program looks for the implementation of a reliable 
platform against radiation effects based on FPGAs that provides to the community a tool 
to evaluate the reliability and performance of different designs to be used in space 
applications. 
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E. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The fault tolerance of the CFTP board depends on the reliability of each one of its 
components. The main components of the CFTP board are two XQVR-4CB228 Xilinx 
FPGAs, one configured as the Control FPGA (X1) and the other as the Experiment 
FPGA (X2). The Fault Tolerance of an FPGA depends on the radiation hardening of its 
resources and the characteristics of the design being implemented on it. Chapter 5 
describes the principal Fault Tolerance Techniques applicable to FPGAs. 
The principal objectives of this work are the implementation, evaluation and 
testing of a Fault Tolerant Control FPGA (FTX1) for space applications. Three different 
designs of a FTX1 were proposed: 3PFTX1, BFTX1 and MFTX1.  
The implementation of these designs is based on the Triple Modular Redundancy 
(TMR) approach with some variations between designs. TMR was selected among the 
fault tolerant techniques applicable to FPGAs since it is the best way to ensure the 
redundancy of the configuration memory and user data and the subsequent increment in 
the reliability of the FPGA. An important point in the implementation of FTX1 is the 
analysis of the amount of resources utilized by each FTX1 design with the objective to 
verify that in fact TMR is implemented properly by the Xilinx ISE software and there is 
not a considerable automatic optimization that can reduce the reliability provided by 
TMR. 
An important requirement for the implementation of a Fault Tolerant Control 
FPGA is that its functionality stays the same than the original Control Unit without 
performance loss. The evaluation of FTX1 is carried on through the operation of the 
CFTP board, the verification of each of its functionalities and the comparison of its 
output against the original X1 output. 
Given that radiation testing was not available at the time of development of this 
work and that the FPGA used to implement X1 can not be replaced in the short term, 
manual injection of errors is proposed. This method consists on the modification of one 
out of three redundant modules so that its output is always in error in comparison with the 
other two. In this way can be proved that the TMR will detect and correct the 
intentionally induced errors. 
16
F. RELATED WORK 
CFTP is an ongoing program in which several students and academics have 
participated for several years. 
Dan Ebert’s Thesis [9] established the initial design of the CFTP architecture. 
This work includes the analysis of the challenges of electronics for space applications, 
reviews the different available technologies to implement the basic components of the 
CFTP board including Random Access Memory (RAM), Read Only Memory (ROM), 
Flash memory, the kind of FPGAs to be used, interfaces, integration of the components 
and possible approaches to implement Fault Tolerance of the CFTP.  
James Coudeyras’s thesis [10], proved by radiation testing the viability of FPGAs 
for space applications. He implemented a design that used the maximum of the resources 
inside the FPGA under test to analyze the SEU rate and the efficiency of detection and 
correction implementations. 
Steven A. Johnson’s thesis [11] deals with the design and implementation of an 
entire 16–bit processor with Triple Modular redundancy (TMR) in order to prove the 
feasibility of the CFTP to implement entire soft-core microprocessors in an efficient and 
reliable manner. 
Peter J. Majewicz’s thesis [12] consists of the design and implementation of a 
five-stage pipelined Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) microprocessor with 
TMR architecture on an FPGA and the analysis of radiation testing of the TMR system. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the basic requirements of computer systems for space 
applications, the characteristics of space environment and its effects over electronics, the 
positives and negatives of Radiation Hardening of electronics, the main objective of the 





The following chapters describe the classification, architecture and radiation 
effects on FPGAs, the CFTP board and in specific the architecture of the Control FPGA, 
the principal fault tolerant techniques applicable to FPGAs and the design 
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II. FPGA ARCHITECTURE 
Conventional microprocessors can be programmed to perform a specific task or 
execute complex computations using basic steps or commands but tend to be slow. 
ASICs are designed to do a specific computation with high efficiency but are difficult to 
adapt to new functionalities. FPGAs like ASICs can be programmed to do a specific 
computation but unlike them, are adaptable (reconfigurable) to new applications. With 
the use of FPGAs, the functionality of various components can be implemented inside the 
FPGA saving space and weight without considerable lost of performance. 
An FPGA is a semiconductor device that consists of logic components and 
interconnect that can be programmed in the field after manufacture to execute any 
function within its logic capabilities. The principle of operation of an FPGA is similar to 
the one in Programmable Read Only Memory (PROM) or other Programmable Logic 
Devices (PLDs) with a huge difference in capacity (number of gates) and flexibility of 
application between these components.  
A. FPGA CLASSIFICATION 
From the architectural point of view FPGAs are classified in four groups [13]: 
• Symmetrical arrays. 
• Row-based array. 
• Sea-of-gates. 
• Hierarchical PLD. 
Depending on the programming process used to configure them, FPGAs can also 
be classified as: 
• SRAM based. 
• Floating Gate. 
• Anti-fuse. 
1.  SRAM-Based FPGAs 
Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) cells are used to store the user’s 
information and configuration data that controls the resources inside the FPGA. Every 
cell controls a small portion of logic behaving like switches connecting or disconnecting 
the resources of the FPGA (Figure 5). The advantage of SRAM-based FPGAs is that they 
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can be re-programmed every time it is necessary and the time to do it is relatively short, 
increasing their reliability. The main disadvantages are that like any other SRAM 
component, the information stored in their configuration registers is lost if the power 
supply goes off requiring an independent booting component to reload the configuration 
of the FPGA. Another disadvantage is that the SRAM devices also require a relatively 




Figure 5.   SRAM-based FPGA (From Ref. [14]) 
 
2.  Floating Gate Programming 
In this case FPGAs are based on EEPROM technology (Figure 6). The advantages 
of this approach are reprogrammability and no lost of information if the power supply 




Figure 6.   Floating Gate Programming (From Ref. [15]) 
 
3.  Anti-Fuse Programming 
As its name indicates, fuses are used as memory components to store the 
configuration information (Figure 7). The advantages of anti-fuse FPGAs are that they 
are relatively small and their tolerance to radiation effects over configuration information. 




Figure 7.   Antifuse FPGA Concept (From Ref. [14]) 
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B. SRAM-BASED FPGA ARCHITECTURE 
Every FPGA type has its own specific features. Reference [14] is a good review 
of the different FPGA architectures.  
The architecture of SRAM-based FPGAs is described here since it is the kind of 
FPGA used in the CFTP board. Xilinx FPGA’s basic structure is a symmetric 
bidimensional array of logic blocks that can be interconnected via horizontal and vertical 
routing channels (Figure 8). The main components of a SRAM-based FPGA are [16]: 
• Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs). 
• Input/Output Blocks (IOBs). 
• Block SelectRAM. 
• Routing Resources. 
• Delay-Locked Loop (DLL). 
 
 
Figure 8.   SRAM-based FPGA Architecture (From Ref.[16]) 
 
23
1. Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) 
The architecture of the entire FPGA is based around the CLBs. These blocks 
contain all the logic of the FPGA (Figure 9). Each CLB is divided into two slices and 
each slice contains two logic cells (LCs). Each LC includes a 4-input function generator 
or Look-up Table (LUT) that can be configured as a 16 x 1-bit synchronous RAM and 
combinations of LUTs provide more complex components like 16 x 2-bit or 32 x 1-bit 
synchronous RAM, a 16x1-bit dual-port synchronous RAM or a 16-bit shift register [16]. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Configurable Logic Block (From Ref.[16]) 
 
In addition to the four basic LCs, each CLB contains logic that combines function 
generators to provide functions of five or six inputs. This additional logic includes flip-
flops, multiplexers, arithmetic logic, carry logic, dedicated internal routing and dedicated 
AND/OR gates.  
The configuration data that determines the functions that will be implemented in 
the CLBs, routing of the outputs and the configuration of the flip-flops are defined in 
memory cells within the CLB. An alternative mode allows some of these memory cells to 
be used directly as RAM.  
 
24
2. Input/Output Blocks (IOBs) 
The IOBs can be configured to act as input, output or bidirectional components. 
Each IOB consists of an input buffer, an output buffer with a three-state, and three 
storage elements that can be programmed as edge-triggered flip flops or level sensitive 
latches [16]. 
3. Block SelectRAM 
The Block SelectRAM is additional memory organized in columns along the 
height of the FPGA. Each Block SelectRAM is a dual-ported RAM with independent 
control signals for each port. 
4. Routing Resources 
The Routing Resources consist of an array of routing switches located at the 
intersections of horizontal and vertical routing channels associated with the rows and 
columns of CLBs. These resources are configured to connect all the different components 
of the FPGA as required and also constitute the clock distribution network for the entire 
FPGA. 
5. Delay-Locked Loop 
The FPGA contains four dedicated clock pads. Associated with each pad is a 
Delay-Locked Loop (DLL) that can control skew between the clock input pad and 
internal clock-input pins throughout the device. 
C. RADIATION EFFECTS ON FPGAS 
Like any other electronic device, FPGAs suffer from the various effects of 
radiation but because of their architecture and functions of its components, some effects 
produce more serious impact than others. And considering that the three FPGAs types 
mentioned above have different structural components, the principles of configuration 
and the effects of radiation on them are different. 
1. SRAM-based FPGAs Radiation Effects 
The most important radiation effects on FPGAs to be considered are the Total 
Ionizing Dose (TID) and the Singe Event Upsets (SEUs). 
The operational parameters of semiconductor devices that suffer from TID are 
voltage threshold shifts, increased device leakage current, power consumption and speed 
degradation. Several SRAM-based FPGAs have been tested against TID [17, 18] with the 
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result that above a radiation level of 30 Krad(Si) there is an increment of leakage current 
and in consequence an increment of power consumption on the chip but no functional 
failures were found. Another result was that the practical maximum TID that the XQVR 
Xilinx FPGAs can resist is 100 Krad(Si). 
SEUs are of great concern among SRAM-based FPGAs since the configuration 
data and the user information stored in its internal memory are vulnerable to 
unintentional change. The susceptibility of SRAM FPGAs is not a secret, different tests 
have prove [19, 20, 21, 22] the effect of SEUs on FPGAs.  
In general, the effects cause by SEUs can be data errors or configuration errors 
affecting the functionality of the logic modules and the routing between the logic 
components. Other effects of SEUs are the Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs) 
and consist of an alteration of logic content causing a global device function to be 
activated like a reset and always require a complete reconfiguration for recovery [52]. 
Reference [18] confirms that the routing resources are the most sensitive to SEU effects 
since the number of bits devoted to manage interconnections between logic elements and 
IOBs can be as much as 78% of the total configuration bits. 
2. Floating Gate FPGAs Radiation Effects 
The basic components of the floating gate FPGA are the flash switch cells that 
control the configuration of the FPGA and represent the maximum susceptibility of the 
FPGA to radiation. 
The primary effect of total ionizing dose in Floating Gate FPGAs is the 
propagation delay and standby power supply current [15]. The accumulation of charge in 
the float gate caused by the ionizing radiation causes the ON or OFF state of the switch to 
drift closer to the neutral state. For the ON-state the effect is a reduction of the current 
drive and subsequently increment in the propagation delay. For the OFF-state switch the 





Unlike SRAM switches, FLASH switches are intrinsically hard against SEUs. A 
SEU occurs when a heavy ion hits a transistor and changes its logic state. In the case of a 
floating gate the change of charge caused by an ion with LET of 37 MeV-cm2/mg is less 
than 1% of the total charge on a programmed floating gate [15] and that is not enough to 
cause a change in the logic state.  
An important effect to be considered in Floating Gate FPGAs is the Single Event 
Latch-up. Supply voltage is the first consideration against latch-up. During programming, 
the voltage inside a Floating Gate FPGA can be as high as 16 volts instead of the 3.3 
volts of normal operation, making the FPGA more vulnerable to latch-up and this most 
be considered in the design of a system requiring reprogramming of the FPGA.  
The Floating Gate FPGA is superior to the SRAM-based FPGA in terms of 
configuration SEUs tolerance. In contrast SRAM-based FPGAs are superior for in orbit 
reconfiguration applications. 
3. Anti-Fuse FPGAs Radiation Effects 
The antifuse FPGA is a device commonly used for space applications for two 
reasons: its high-density programmable logic and the ionizing radiation tolerance of its 
programmable switches. In general, anti-fuse FPGAs are considered TID tolerant with 
one restriction. One of the principal components of the Antifuse FPGA that the (SRAM 
does not have) is the charge pump circuit.  It provides a voltage higher than the supply 
voltage on the gate of the isolation NMOS transistor so that they can pass VCC signals 
without degradation.  The isolation transistor functions as a turn-off pass gate to isolate 
high voltage programming voltage (typically > 2VCC) from low voltage (VCC) 
transistors in the logic module [23]. The TID causes the output voltage of the pump to 
decrease and the supply current increases to a point that can damage the FPGA. 
Memory components are susceptible to SEUs but modern Antifuse FPGAs have 
hardened flip flops making the FPGA more immune to SEUs. Tests performed on Actel 





D. FPGA COMPARISON 
Each type of FPGA explained in this chapter has its specific properties, pros and 
cons. The factor that determines which one is the best FPGA type is the application for 
which the FPGA is going to be used. 
SRAM-based FPGAs are the largest ones in the market. The susceptibility to TID 
and Single Event Effects is a factor that would limit its use for space applications. The 
easy of use, reprogrammability and amount of resources in the chip are important 
properties that make them candidates for applications that require flexibility. 
Floating Gate based FPGAs are less susceptible to TID than SRAM-based FPGAs 
and are completely fault tolerant to SEUs. The inconvenience in the use of theses devices 
is the equipment and operation required to reprogram these FPGAs. 
Antifuse FPGAs are the fastest and densest in the market, the fault tolerance 
against TID and SEEs have made them one of the devices most used in space 
applications. The great inconvenience of these FPGAs is that they can not be 
reprogrammed at all. 
Table 2 abstracts the comparison explained in this section. 
 
 SRAM Antifuse Floating Gate 
Speed Worst Best Medium 
Power Varies Medium Best 
Density Worst Medium Best 
Radiation Worst Best Medium 
Reprogrammable Yes No Yes 
Table 2. Comparison between FPGA Types 
  
The FPGAs used in the CFTP are the XQVR600 -4CB228; these are Rad-Hard 
SRAM-base FPGAs. The main reasons for the utilization of this type of FPGA in the 




E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the different FPGA technologies and the programming 
process for each one, the basic architectural components and radiation effects on SRAM-
based FPGA with an emphasis on SEUs causing configuration and data errors.  
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III. CONFIGURABLE FAULT TOLERANT PROCESSOR (CFTP) 
OVERVIEW 
The challenges inherent to electronics for space applications have pushed the 
development of new technologies and the adaptation of current ones. The first time an 
FPGA was used for space applications occurred in 1992 in the Aerospace Corporation’s 
Data Processing Unit (DPU) for the SAMPEX spacecraft [53]. This event marked the 
beginning of a new era in which universal electronic devices have been replaced by 
FPGAs, with the result of more reliability, less cost and with no substantial loss of 
performance for space applications 
The CFTP program was conceived with the objective to provide the community 
with a platform in which the implementation and verification of electronic designs for 
space applications could be carried on both on the ground and in space. In order to 
achieve this objective, the CFTP needed to be based on COTS components, to have the 
properties of reliability, reconfigurability, low-power consumption, flexibility and low 
cost.  
The conception of CFTP was not a one person achievement, but the result of the 
work of academics, technicians and students. Reference [9] explains in detail the reasons 
for the architecture and selection of the different CFTP components, operation and the 
expected functionality of the integrated system 
A. CFTP ARCHITECTURE 
Any computer system contains a Central Processing Unit (CPU), system memory 
and a storage component. The CFTP consists of a series of COTS components including 
FPGAs that realize the same functions as in any other computer system but with the 
additional property that these COTS devices must be able to withstand the harsh space 
environment, providing, reliability and flexibility to the CFTP.  
The use of COTS FPGAs for space applications has increased over time for the 
only reason that they are good. FPGAs reduce the development time of any application; 
in fact an FPGA can be launched into space without any specific functionality and later 
on be configured to execute the desired work or computation. If that initial work has to be 
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changed at a later time, a new configuration can be loaded into the FPGA providing 
flexibility. The cost of an FPGA is considerable higher than a microprocessor but its 
functionality and capabilities are worth it. An FPGA is manufactured like any other 
electronic component and the risks of failure are pretty much the same but there is a big 
difference. If a hard fault exists, instead of having to replace the component, the FPGA 
can be reconfigured again, thus increasing the reliability of the system.  
The CTPF board basically consists of 2 Virtex XQVR600 -4CB228 Rad-Hard 
SRAM-based FPGAs. The first FPGA called Control FPGA or X1 is connected to the 
space craft Command and Data Handler (C&DH) through a PC-104 bus that acts as the 
interface between these two units. It is also directly connected to the second FPGA called 
the Experiment FPGA or X2, which will hold the experiments running on CFTP. Figure 
10 illustrates the actual architecture of the CFTP board. 
 
 
Figure 10.   CFTP Development Board (From Ref. [24]) 
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In addition to the 2 Virtex FPGAs, the CFTP contains system memory, storage 
memory and interfaces to connect the different components inside CFTP and with the 
outside world.  
1. Experiment FPGA (X2) 
The central component of the CFTP is the reconfigurable core formed by two 
FPGAs, the control FPGA and the experiment FPGA. These are Xilinx XQV600 -4C228 














XQVR300 322,970 32x48 6,912 316 65,536 98,304 
XQVR600 661,111 48x72 15,552 316 98,304 221,184 
XQVR1000 1,124,022 64x96 27,648 404 131,072 393,216 
Table 3. XQVR Family Information (From Ref. [25]) 
   
The architecture of SRAM-based FPGAs was explained previously in Chapter II. 
The resources on the FPGA (LUTs, SelectRAMs, Flip Flops, IOBs, etc) are spread across 
the chip and grouped together in configurable blocks. The basic unit is the CLB. The 
XQV 600 FPGA has a grid of CLBs distributed in 48 rows and 72 columns with a total of 
15,552 logic gates which, when configured, provide functionality to the design. In 
addition to the CLBs, there are IOBs (Input/Output Blocks), IOIs (IOB Interconnects), 
98,304 bits of BRAMs (Block RAMs), BRAMIs (BRAM Interconnects), 221,184 bits of 
Select RAM and 4 Global Clock (GCLK) blocks.  
The X2 is the component of the CFTP where experiments take place which is the 
main objective of the CFTP program. An FPGA is not fault tolerant by itself meaning 
that the reliability of X2 will depend in great part on the reliability of the circuit or design 
being implemented. Therefore, the designers will have the opportunity to create their own 
designs and expose them to the harsh space environment or a simulation of it and verify 
that the designs work as desired. 
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The obvious limitation of X2 is the amount of logic in the FPGA and needs to be 
considered for the design of applications. Currently, several experiments [11,12,26,] have 
been implemented successfully in X2. These experiments include a 16-bit Reduced 
Instruction Set Computer (RISC) microprocessor, a Cordic algorithm, a multiplier, etc.  
Even though experimentation is the reason to be of CFTP, X2 is not the only 
component in CFTP board, a means for evaluating the experiment is required and that is 
one of the functions that X1 needs to accomplish. 
2. Control FPGA (X1)  
The control FPGA like X2 is an XQVR600 FPGA. Reference [9] explains that a 
possibility for the implementation of X1 was to use an anti-fuse FPGA because of its 
radiation hardness but its limitations in capacity and reprogrammability leaded to the use 
of SRAM-based FPGAs.  
The integration of the different CFTP components takes place in X1. It includes 
the interface between the control FPGA and the experiment FPGA for verification 
(Scrubbing) and data flow. It also includes the interface with the PC/104 bus for the data 
flow between the CFTP and the Command and Data Handler (C&DH) that includes the 
load of experiment’s configuration to the flash memory in the CFTP and the reading of 
the output of the experiment running in X2.  
The functionality of X1 includes: 
• Control of X2 configuration and subsequent reconfigurations. 
• Verification of the experiment running in X2 through scrubbing. 
• Interfacing with system memory (Flash and EEPROM). 
• Handling communication with the outside world trough the PC104 bus. 
X1 consists of six modules that together provide the functionality explained 
above. The objective of this work was to make the configuration of X1 fault tolerant and 
because of the importance of these modules to this thesis, the next chapter is dedicated to 
explain their functionality. 
3. EEPROM 
Since the FPGAs used in CFTP are SRAM-based, SEEs represent a problem 
because data and even worse configuration information can be altered with the 
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consequent lost of functionality. When a hard fault that X1 can not repair by itself occurs, 
then the entire CFTP must be rebooted and since one of the characteristics of SRAM-
based FPGAs is that it is an entirely volatile device a means to store the initial X1 
configuration is required. The device used for this purpose is the Xilinx QPro 
XQR17V16 EEPROM. It is a One-Time Programmable (OTP) read-only memory 
designed to store configuration bitstreams of Xilinx FPGA devices with a capacity of 16 
Mbits and a TID of 50 Krad [9]. 
The default mode of operation of the CFTP in flight will involve X1 booting from 
the Xilinx EEPROM in master serial mode on power-up or reconfiguration. X1 enters the 
Master Serial mode whenever all three of its select mode pins are low (M0=0, M1=0, 
M2=0). Data is read from the EEPROM sequentially on a single data line. 
Synchronization is provided by the rising edge of the temporary signal CCLK, which is 
generated during configuration. Master Serial Mode provides a simple configuration 
interface. Only a serial data line, two control lines, and a clock line are required to 
configure the FPGA. Data from the PROM is read sequentially, accessed via the internal 
address and bit counters which are incremented on every valid rising edge of CCLK [27]. 
4. Flash Memory 
The CFTP board also contains an Intel TE28F320C3BA 32Mbit flash memory 
that stores the experiment’s configuration to be loaded in X2. This flash memory device 
provides high-performance asynchronous reads in package compatible densities with a 16 
bit data bus. Individually-erasable memory blocks are optimally sized for code and data 
storage [28]. There are physical connections between the flash and both FPGAs in a way 
that X1 can read and write to the flash and X2 can read from the flash under the control 
of X1. This flash memory is capable of holding as many as eight configurations of X2 
[9]. 
5. SDRAM 
By definition any computer system has to have system memory and that was the 
basic reason to include SDRAM in the CFTP board. SDRAM does not participate in the 




requires it. 128 MB of SDRAM Hitachi HM5225405B-75 are included in the CFTP 
board. This lot of Hitachi SDRAM performed in testing to better than 40 krad TID with 
an SEL threshold of 46.5 MeV-cm2/mg [29]. 
6. PC/104 Bus 
The PC104 bus is an embedded computer standard controlled by the PC/104 
Consortium. The PC/104 bus was designed for applications that depend on reliable data 
acquisition despite an often extreme environment. The PC/104 bus utilizes 104 pins. 
These pins include all the normal lines used in the ISA bus, with additional ground pins 
added to ensure bus integrity [30] 
The CFTP has a PC/104 bus between the CFTP board itself and a processor 
board. This connection provides all communication and file transfer between the CFTP 
and the spacecraft’s C&DH 
B. OPERATION OF THE CFTP BOARD 
All the processes occurring inside the CFTP are regulated by the Control FPGA 
and their objective is to configure and verify the experiments running in X2. In order to 
understand the way CFTP operates, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms through 
which the FPGAs can be configured. There are four methods available to configure the 
Virtex FPGAs [31]: 
• Boundary Scan mode (JTAG) 
• SelectMAP mode. 
• Master Serial mode. 
• Slave Serial mode. 
1. Boundary Scan Mode (JTAG) 
JTAG or Boundary Scan mode is an industry standard (IEEE 1149.1, or 1532) 
serial programming mode. External logic from a cable, microprocessor, or other device is 
used to drive the JTAG specific pins. The data in this mode is loaded at one bit per 
assertion of TCK. The Boundary Scan mode is always active when the device is powered 
[31]. The JTAG mode facilitates test and development of configurations by its design, 
although it can also be used as a readback and reconfiguration method. The boundary-
scan mode is selected by a <101> or <001> on the mode pins (M2, M1, M0).  
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2. SelectMAP Mode 
The SelectMAP mode is the fastest configuration option allowing parallel reading 
and writing through byte-wide ports. An external clock source, microprocessor, 
download cable or other FPGA is required in order to provide a byte stream, CCLK, a 
Chip Select (CS) signal and a Write enable signal (WRITE). The data is loaded one byte 
per CCLK in this mode. Data can also be read using the SelectMAP mode and multiple 
Virtex devices can be chained in parallel. SelectMAP provides an “8-bit bidirectional 
data bus interface” [49], or parallel load capability, for Virtex devices. This mode may be 
used for both configuration and for readback, and provides a means for the device to be 
partially reconfigured while it is operating. In this mode, devices may be connected in a 
parallel-chain, but not serially [31]. After configuration, the pins of the SelectMAP port 
can be used as additional user I/O. Alternatively, the port can be retained to permit high-
speed 8-bit readback. This mode is typically used as a configuration mode when 
configuration speed is an important factor. The SelectMAP mode is selected by a <110> 
or <010> inputs on the mode pins (M2, M1, M0).  
3. Master Serial Mode 
It is the simplest configuration method for FPGAs. The FPGA loads configuration 
data from a serial PROM. Using the FPGA to provide the clock, it virtually loads itself 
and utilizes its internal oscillator, which drives the configuration clock. The FPGA 
provides all the control logic. In this mode, data is loaded at one bit per CCLK. The 
interface is identical to slave-serial except that an internal oscillator is used to generate 
the configuration clock (CCLK). Master-serial mode is selected by a <000> or <100> 
inputs on the mode pins (M2, M1, M0).   
4. Slave Serial Mode 
In this mode, the FPGA receives configuration data in bit-serial form from a serial 
PROM or other source of serial configuration data that is loaded at one bit per CCLK. 
Multiple FPGAs can be daisy-chained for configuration from a single source. Slave serial 
mode is selected by applying <111> or <011> to the mode pins (M2, M1, M0).  
The operation of the CFTP is centered in the process of configuring the 
experiment FPGA and reading back its configuration, the results of the computations and 
other data flow.  
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At power-up the control FPGA boots from the EEPROM in master serial mode. 
The EEPROM contains the initial configuration of the control FPGA that has the 
functionality for programming the experiment FPGA from the Flash, communicating 
with the processor through the PC/104 bus, and reading back the experiment FPGAs 
configuration and comparing it with the configuration stored in the Flash. Once X2 is in 
operation, the flow of information between X1 and X2 is carried on trough 43 general I/O 
pins. If it is required, X2 can make use of the SDRAM available in the CFTP board.  
X1 has the capability of readback and reconfigure X2 while it is in operation. In 
order to do it, the FPGA must be set in either JTAG or SelectMAP mode.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the architecture of the CFTP board, the characteristics of 
its different components and the functions that they execute in the system. A general 
explanation of the methods to configure FPGAs and the process of operation of the CFTP 
is also explained. 
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IV. CONTROL FPGA (X1) ARCHITECTURE 
The core of the functionality of the CFTP is the control FPGA (X1). It includes 
the interface between X1 and X2 for verification (Scrubbing) and data flow. It also 
includes an interface with the PC/104 bus for the data exchange between the CFTP and 
the C&DH used to load the experiment’s configuration to the flash memory in the CFTP 
board and to read the output of the experiment running in X2.  
The functionality of X1 includes: 
• Control of the initial configuration and subsequent reconfigurations of X2. 
• Verification of the experiment running in X2 through scrubbing. 
• Interfacing with system memory (Flash and EEPROM). 
• Handling communication with the outside world trough a PC/104 bus. 
X1 consists of six Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Hardware Description 









Figure 11.   X1 Architecture (From Ref. [24].) 
 
The architecture of X1 is illustrated in Figure 11. Each of the modules 
accomplishes a specific mission. In the next sections, each module will be explained in 
detail without any specific order. 
A.  CLOCK GENERATOR (CLOCKGEN.VHD) 
The most important signal for any synchronous component is a clock signal. Even 
though the CFTP board cannot be considered an entirely synchronous system, 
synchronization between X1 and X2 is critical. 
This module is not exactly a clock generator. The ARM processor connected to 
the CFTP contains an oscillator that generates a global clock signal at 51 MHz. The X1 
components and possibly the experiment running in X2 require a clock signal of different 
frequency and this is exactly the function of the clockGen.vhd module. Currently the only 
two output signals of the clock generator module are s_clock at 25.5 MHz and 




25.5 Mhz clock signal. Depending on the specific design, experiments running in X2 may 
run at a different speed. The code of the clock generator can be easily modified to get the 
required clock frequencies. 
B. PC/104 INTERFACE (PC104INT.VHD) 
The only connection between the CFTP board and the C&DH board is the PC/104 
Bus. It is responsible for all data transfers in and out the CFTP to the C&DH. The PC/104 
interface module is asynchronous therefore handshaking signals are necessary for the 
flow control of information passing through it. The internal side of the interface has 
module ports for write, read and status flags. The status flags display the current state of 
the FIFO. The FIFO is 32-bits wide and 63-words deep and is generated using the 
CoreGen tool of the Xilinx ISE v6.1 software. 
Basically the pc104Int.vhd module does two functions: 
• Control of the flow of information from the experiment FPGA to the ARM 
processor. 
• Control of the flow of information from the ARM processor to the flash 
memory. 
The first step in order to accomplish the functions above is to verify the memory 
range used by the PC/104 bus, the second step consists of the detection of a reset state 
and from there the module has to determine if a read or a write needs to be executed.  
The read process (Information from the CFTP to the PC/104 bus) starts with a 
check on a reset signal coming from the ARM side, if not a reset, the process verifies if 
the next operation is a read from the ARM processor to the FIFO. The read process is 
controlled by a status signal that indicates when there is information available in the 
FIFO buffer to be served.  
The write process (Information from the ARM to the CFTP) is similar to the read 
process with a small difference. The write process is executed byte by byte with the 
control of a status signal that indicates when the FPGA is busy processing a byte and 
when is ready to receive the next one. 
The FIFO buffer uses an interrupt routine to control the flow of data getting in 
and out of the CFTP. Once the FIFO is full it stops accepting data. 
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C. X2 INTERFACE (X2INT.VHD) 
One of the functions of X1 is the verification (scrubbing) of X2 and the transfer of 
information between X2 and the ARM processor, in order to be able to do this, X1 needs 
an interface to communicate with X2 and this is the objective of the x2Int.vhd module. 
The main functions of the X2 interface are: 
• Reset X2 and the X2 interface signals to specific values. 
• Determine the amount of data that has been transferred from X2 to the 
PC/104 bus. 
• Determine the transfer rate of data from X2 to the PC/104 bus. 
• Control the rate at which SelectMAP readbacks occur. 
• Control the SelectMAP reconfiguration. 
The interaction between X1 and X2 must be synchronized and it has to start from 
a known point at a specific instant. This goal is met by a reset operation. The signal used 
for this purpose in X1 is RESET_i that sets all x2Int.vhd signals to specific values and 
the same job is done in X2 by the DATA_TO_X2_RESET_o signal. With this process 
the operations and communication between the two FPGAs is guaranteed to occur 
synchronously. The byte size is controlled by a constant value 
(REPORT_OUT_LENGTH) inside the X2 interface code.  
The transfer rate depends on the data size and the value of the sampling rate that 
is specified by another constant (ERR_RPT_TIME) inside the X2 interface. These values 
can be easily changed to adapt the interface to the requirements of the experiments 
running in X2.  
The period of time between SelectMAP readback operations is specified by the 
value of the constant DLY_TIME in the X2 interface code. 
The SelectMap reconfiguration is controlled by the number of errors reported by 
the experiment FPGA. This number is specified in x2Int.vhd code with the err_cnt 
constant. 
D. SELECTMAP CONFIGURATION (selectmap_config.vhd) 
The primary function of this module is to program the experiment FPGA. The 
configuration of X2 takes place following two different events. First X2 is programmed 
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every time an experiment needs to be loaded in X2 and second, every time the number of 
accumulated errors occurring in X2 is equal to a threshold value specified by the designer 
in the x2Int.vhd module. In each of the two cases the SelectMap configuration module 
reads the configuration data stored in the flash memory starting from address zero and 
loads the next 900 Kbytes of configuration data into X2. The number of errors that the 
experiment FPGA can handle depends on the requirement of each experiment and the 
desires of the designer and there is no rule on the amount of errors that forces the 
necessity of a reconfiguration of X2. 
E. SELECTMAP READBACK (selectmap_readback.vhd) 
This module reads all the data stored in the configuration memory of X2 and 
compares it against the configuration data stored in the flash memory. It is used to verify 
that the current configuration of X2 is correct providing some level of reliability to the 
CFTP. 
In order to execute a readback or reconfiguration operation specific commands 
and procedures need to be executed. The entire process is explained in detail in Ref. [31]. 
F. TOP LEVEL MODULE (top_level.vhd) 
This is the module in which all the control FPGA components come together. The 
basic functions of top_level.vhd are to arbitrate between the other X1 modules by 
assigning values to the signals that control the processes inside those modules. 
Additionally top level sets values to signals that are constant like setting the mode pins of 
X2 to the SelectMap mode. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a description of the architecture of the control FPGA and the 
functionality and interaction between its six modules has been explained. The following 
chapter describes the fault tolerant techniques suitable for FPGAs and the three different 
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V. FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL FPGA (FTX1) 
The objective of the CFTP program is to provide a platform for the verification 
and testing of designs for space applications. This requires that all its components be fault 
tolerant. Chapter III describes the tolerance to radiation that every component of the 
CFTP has embedded on it. The XQVR600 FPGAs are the critical components of the 
CFTP. They are latch-up immune to a Linear Energy Transfer (LET) of 125MeV-
cm2/mg and radiation tolerant to 100krad TID [33] but are quite susceptible to SEUs. 
Various experiments tested to date in X2 [10, 12] have proved that the X2 design can be 
fault tolerant but no work had been done in X1 to make it Fault Tolerant.  
This chapter describes several fault tolerant techniques applicable to FPGAs and 
three different approaches to make X1 fault tolerant. These designs are “3PFTX1,” 
“BFTX1” and “MFTX1.”  
A. FAULT TOLERANT TECHNIQUES APPLICABLE TO FPGAS 
SEUs are the primary concern of FPGAs for space applications. The effects 
caused by SEUS in SRAM-based FPGAs depend on the place or resource that the 
radiation particle hits in the FPGA and the energy level of the particle. The effects of 
SEUs on FPGAs can be classified into transient errors and permanent errors [46]. 
Transient errors affect the user-defined logic and flip-flops of the FPGA. The user 
logic includes block RAM (BRAM), configuration logic block flip-flops and I/O block 
flip-flops (IOB-FF) [33].  
SEUs can cause permanent errors on an FPGA if they alter the contents of 
configuration memory. Permanent errors are classified into routing errors, LUT bit-flips, 
and control/clocking bit-flips. Permanent errors are more common than transient errors 
because the number of SRAM cells dominates the number of user-defined memory 
elements. Typically, the number of SRAM configuration cells is more than 98% of all 




The growth of more demanding applications, the advance of the technology and 
the subsequent vulnerability of smaller and faster components have pushed the 
development of fault tolerant techniques to increase the reliability of computer systems. 
Fault tolerant techniques applicable to FPGAs can be classified in two groups [39]: 
• Circuit level modification method. 
• High-level description method. 
1. Circuit Level Modification Method 
The circuit level modification method consists in the re-manufacturing of the 
FPGA by including fault-tolerant elements. This approach may include the replacement 
of the old and less reliable elements by radiation hardened ones without modifications of 
the original architecture or the implementation of a new FPGA architecture that improves 
the reliability of the device. An obvious example of these techniques is the radiation 
hardening of an FPGA by using larger size components, different manufacturing 
technologies like Silicon On Insulator (SOI) or the triplication of the resources inside the 
FPGA [38]. 
A second approach consists on the use of spare components in such a way that 
when a fault is detected and located in one of the components of the FPGA, the faulty 
component is discarded and replaced by another one that was not in use [39]. The spare 
parts can be distributed in different ways. In Reference [37] two possible distributions of 
spare allocation are proposed (king-shifting and horse-allocation). 
Another option includes the implementation of Error Detection And Correction 
(EDAC) codes like the Hamming and the Reed-Solomon codes inside the architecture of 
the FPGA [38], with the limitation that these codes are able to identify just one upset and 
their implementation for the detection of multiple upsets increases the area and delay 
overhead  of the design [38].  
Circuit Level Modification techniques imply a change in the manufacturing 
process of the FPGA and in consequence an increment in the production cost and the 




2. High-Level Description Method 
This method is not based on the modification of the original resources of the 
FPGA, instead, the design being programmed in the FPGA must include some fault 
tolerant characteristic. It is normally based in some kind of redundancy so that, if one 
component fails, the circuit can continue operating with the fault free components [38]. 
The most common method of fault tolerant redundancy is the Triple Module Redundancy 
(TMR) with voting [40, 41, 42] first proposed by Von Neumann [51].  
The correct implementation of TMR with the Virtex FPGA depends on various 
factors such as the size and the type of the module to be mitigated. TMR can be 
implemented based on the module size in four ways [5]: Module Redundancy, Logic 
Partitioning Redundancy, Logic Duplication Redundancy and Device Redundancy [50]. 
TMR can also be implemented based on the type of data structure to be mitigated. The 
logic may be grouped into four different structure types: Throughput Logic, State-
machine Logic, I/O Logic, and Special Features (SelectRAM block, DLLs, etc.) [38]. A 
good reference of the implementation of TMR on Virtex FPGAs is [42]. An example of 
the implementation of TMR is illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Triple Modular Redundancy for Xilinx FPGAs (From Ref. [42]) 
 
Conventional fault-tolerant schemes can only protect user-bits but not 
configuration bits. The only applicable fault-tolerant mechanism to protect configuration 
bits is to use Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) scheme in all used logic and routing 
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resources [46]. TMR is an attractive solution for SRAM based FPGAs even that the area 
of the design and amount of resources utilized in the FPGA is increased substantially 
[33].  
The high-level SEU mitigation technique used nowadays to protect designs 
implemented in the Virtex architecture is mostly based on TMR combined with scrubbing 
[38]. Scrubbing refers to the periodic readback of the FPGA’s configuration memory, 
comparing it to a known good copy, and writing back any corrections required [49]. 
Scrubbing allows a system to repair SEUs in the configuration memory without 
disrupting its operations [44]. 
TMR is a solid and attractive solution to increase the reliability of FPGAs but it 
still present some disadvantages [43, 44, 48, 49]:  
• Excessive area overhead. The hardened design has 200% more area than 
the original circuit.  
• TMR system can withstand only single upsets at any instant of time, thus, 
if two redundant modules are simultaneously upset, then the output cannot 
be guaranteed to be correct.  
• The redundant system is considered SEU tolerant under the assumption 
that the voter circuit is completely immune to SEUs. 
• Speed degradation. 
• The number of I/O pads available for designers is reduced by three, 
because the inputs and outputs of each TMR redundant block are 
triplicated too.  
• The power consumption is increased by three as all input and output pins 
as well as the combinational and sequential logic are triplicated. 
• Traditional TMR does not provide a way of re-synchronizing state logic 
after configuration scrubbing. After a SEU in a traditional TMR state 
machine is corrected through scrubbing, the state machines must be reset 
to resynchronize.  
This approach does not require re-design of the FPGA or changes in the 
manufacturing process. Consequently, the cost of implementation is lower than the circuit 
level modification methods and the designer has the advantage to choose the level of 




dissipation [38]. The fact that TMR does not require changes at the mask level is not 
exactly a perfect option and it presents some limitations to the designer since there are 
things inside the FPGA that he can not change, control or even know about. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL FPGA (FTX1) 
The considerations in order to make a device fault tolerant are the device itself, 
the tasks to be executed by the device, the environment of operation and the requirements 
of reliability of the system. The architecture and functionality of X1 were discussed 
previously in Chapter IV. From that information as a starting point, the Fault Tolerant 
Control Unit was implemented in three different ways for a couple of reasons. First, the 
fact that the fault tolerant control unit was not designed from scratch, instead, the already 
functional X1 was modified to include the fault tolerant characteristics represented a 
limitation on the techniques available. Second, there are in general two methods to 
implement a circuit in VHDL, architectural and behavioral and the modules and 
interfaces already existent in the CFTP program were developed with the behavioral 
method.  
The XQVR600 FPGA used to implement X1 has a total of 3,364,928 
configuration latches and its configuration bitstream is 3.608 Mbits [25]. All these 
configuration bits are potentially sensitive to SEUs and consequently, they must be 
protected by a fault tolerant technique. Figure 12 illustrates the location of configuration 
memory cells in an FPGA. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Configuration Memory of an FPGA (From Ref. [38]) 
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The effect of an upset in the FPGA matrix is unique for each type of 
programmable structure, such as LUT cells, routing cells, flip-flop cells and embedded 
memory cells. The effects of SEUs in different components of FPGAs have been 
investigated previously [47, 48].  
The TMR technique does not have any rules about which resources of a design to 
triplicate. The redundancy can go from the triplication of an entire chip (three FPGAs 
executing the same function instead of one) to the triplication of single logic gates. The 
level of granularity really depends on the characteristics of the design been triplicated and 
the requirements of the designer. Every component triplicated becomes fault tolerant to 
SEUs but at the same time the area of the design increases by three. In consequence, the 
probability that an energized particle will cause a SEU increases. Even that TMR 
improves the reliability of a system, and the level of reliability increases with the 
triplication of every single component, its disadvantages already discussed in the 
previous section have worst effects, mainly an increment in the cross section of the 
device [6].  
1. 3PFTX1 Implementation 
All the functionality of X1 is based on the six modules already discussed in 
Chapter IV. In order to assure reliability through TMR, the effects of an upset should be 
isolated inside a single redundant module, so it can not affect the other two replicas of the 
module.  
The first obvious design decision was that all six modules of X1 had to be 
triplicated and their outputs voted. Where to implement the triplication modules and up to 
what extent of granularity were the second and not an easy decision to make. As 
mentioned before, this work did not start from zero; instead, the already functional X1 
was modified to include TMR.  
From the basic definition of TMR, the 3PFTX1 implementation was based on the 
triplication of the overall X1. What it means by overall is that the inputs, outputs, 




control FPGA contains three X1s (Figure 14). The granularity of the triplication is at the 
module level. With this design the hope is that all the components utilized to implement 
the original X1 will be triplicated without omissions. 
The top_level.vhd module contains the entity cftp_arm, which is where the rest of 
the components are declared and instantiated and the arbitration processes take place. 
This approach includes the triplication of the top level module and everything included in 
it.  
The problem with the implementation of this design was the FPGA itself. In order 
to implement overall TMR one basic requirement is that every input and output signal 
needs three pins in order to be triplicated and the XQVR600-4CB228 FPGA contains just 
228 pins already in use. Just three pins are available at this time and the requirement is 
121 pins per X1 module plus additional pins for power and ground.  
 
 
Figure 14.   3PFTX1 Implementation 
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A second limitation is that a User Constraint File (UCF) is required to define the 
physical implementation of X1 inside the FPGA and more specifically, the pin 
assignments. Since the entire X1 is triplicated, 3PFTX1 has 3 different top_level.vhd 
modules and just one UCF file can be used to define the pin assignments. To solve this 
limitation a higher hierarchical module was created (Super_top_level). The first option to 
implement the UCF file for the super top level module was to create a UCF file 
containing the definition of the pins for the triplicated modules but there are not enough 
pins in the FPGA, the second option was to triplicate the UCF file and assign one per 
top_level.vhd module but just one UCF file can be defined per design. The bottom line is 
that 3PFTX1 was not a viable implementation since three pins per signal are required and 
the XQVR600 does not have enough pins for this purpose. 
Given that the implementation of this design was not possible because of 
hardware restrictions, another design was proposed. BFTX1 is a modified 3PFTX1 in 
which all modules (except top_level.vhd) and the functionality of X1 are triplicated. The 
differences between these two implementations are that in BFTX1 the inputs of X1 come 
from one pin and then are split into triplicated data flows and that the outputs coming 
from triplicated modules are voted by a majority voter and then outputted in just one pin.  
2. BFTX1 Implementation 
The basic idea in the implementation of BFTX1 is to exploit the instantiation of 
all the X1 components inside the top level module. A very simple method for 
implementing SEU mitigation in X1 is to triplicate the instances of each one of the X1 
components defined in top_level.vhd and vote the final outputs coming from the modules 
[41]. In order to avoid the inconvenience of having a single point of failure with the 





Figure 15.   TMR Implemented with Three Output Voters. (From Ref. [41]) 
 
The inconvenience of this implementation is that since top_level.vhd could not be 
triplicated for the reasons already explained, just one copy of every signal appearing in 
this module is allowed, so just one voter per signal was implemented. 
Figure 16 shows the implementation of TMR based on the redundancy of 




Figure 16.   BFTX1 Implementation 
 
The first consideration in this implementation is that any of the input signals of 
X1 is triplicated, then from a single input point a signal is redirected to three different 
instances and the same happens with the output signals from X1, in this case the outputs 
from the triplicated modules go to a final voter and then to a single output pin. Each input 
and output pin is connected inside the FPGA to a single IOB and since there is not 
triplication of the signals IOBs represent single points of failure in the same way as one 
voter per signal. 
Another consideration is that the Xilinx ISE software is smart enough to 
distinguish when a designer is making the mistake of including replicas of a component 
or a signal and it simplifies the design to achieve the highest performance. The problem is 
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that the replication of instances is not always a mistake. The BFX1 design uses three 
instances of the same component. The redundancy of these instances is a primary 
requirement for the reliability of the design. A theory is that the optimization tool of 
Xilinx ISE identifies three instances of the same component and automatically simplifies 
the design by replacing some resources used by others or even deleting redundant 
components. This optimization is part of the synthesis process of a design and can not be 
avoided.  
The disadvantage of the TMR implementation with redundant instances is that 
this technique does not provide a simple and robust recovery mechanism after an error 
has been detected in one of the modules. The errors occurring in any place of an 
instantiation will not be detected until the output of the module. With combinational logic 
this is not a problem because the next clock after the detection of the error will load the 
proper value of the signal in error, but if one of the instantiations contains sequential 
elements its internal state can be very much different at the output of the redundant 
modules. The consequence is that the instantiation that presented the error will be useless 
since the recovery to the proper state of the sequential logic is not automatic. The only 
method to solve this is to apply some means to resynchronize the modules before another 
copy of the instantiation presents an error [46].  
The advantage of this approach is that the implementation is pretty simple. The 
only modification that had to be done was the addition of redundant instances in the 
top_level.vhd module and voters for each one of the output signals. 
3. MFTX1 Implementation 
Some questions emerged about the inevitable and undesired level of optimization 
that the Xilinx ISE software implemented in the BFTX1. In order to verify that the Xilinx 
ISE software used in this work was not simplifying the TMR of X1 to the point that it 
was non-existent, a different design was proposed in which instead of instantiating the 
components of X1, they are triplicated as differently named components and then 
instantiated expecting that this would push Xilinx ISE software to believe that these are 
indeed different components and to reduce the simplification. 
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MFTX1 is based as in the previous implementation, on the TMR of the original 
X1 modules except top_level.vhd for the reasons already exposed. But there is a big 
difference between BFTX1 and MFTX1. In this case, the instances defined inside 
top_level.vhd are not triplicated, instead, three copies of the same module are generated 




Figure 17.   MFTX1 Implementation 
 
The hypothesis with this design is that the Xilinx ISE software will not be able to 
distinguish between the redundant modules and the un-intentioned simplification will be 
less than in the BFTX1 implementation. 
The same considerations mentioned for the implementation of BFTX1 apply in 
this case too.  
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The redundancy of components is a very effective technique of SEU mitigation 
that is easy to implement and can be performed entirely within a single device as long as 
the original design does not utilize more than a third of the total device [46]. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a review of the principal Fault Tolerant techniques applicable to 
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VI. EVALUATION OF THE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL 
FPGA (FTX1) 
In the previous chapter, three different implementation of a FTX1 were proposed. 
All three designs are based on TMR with some variations. These variations are a 
consequence of restrictions in the CFTP board or unknowns about the way in which 
Xilinx ISE software implements the designs. 
The problem with the implementation of the 3PFTX1 design is its requirement of 
three pins per input and output signal that could not be accomplished with the current 
CFTP hardware. For this reason the 3PFTX1 was not implemented and its analysis is not 
covered in this work. The other two designs proposed in this thesis were implemented 
successfully in the CFTP. An analysis of BFTX1 and MFTX1 is presented in this chapter. 
In order to evaluate the proposed FTX1 designs, a point of reference and specific 
benchmarks are needed. The best way to evaluate the Fault Tolerance of FTX1 against 
SEUs is to expose it to radiation and measure the effective cross section of the device but 
this option is expensive and was not available at the time of development of this work. A 
second option is to implement a component in FTX1 capable of injecting errors and 
execute scrubbing operations (as X1 does with X2). This job can be accomplished by 
including the functionality of X1 in the C&DH unit but this limits the portability of the 
CFTP board since in some applications there will not be a dedicated microprocessor to 
attend the FTX1 requirements and if there is one, the scrubbing process for X1 will 
reduce its performance. Another approach is the implementation of the functionality of 
X1 inside X2 but this sounds much like a self-licking ice cream cone. A third approach is 
the addition of a component (like an Anti-fuse FPGA) in the CFTP board that executes 
the injection of errors and scrubbing of X1 just for testing purposes but this implies 
modifications in the CFTP architecture and that was not an option. 
Given the limitations for testing the FTX1, a manual injection of errors was 
implemented. This consists of the insertion of inverters at the outputs of one of the 
redundant modules in such a way that one out of three modules is always in error. 
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A. HARDWARE UTILIZATION IN THE FTX1 IMPLEMENTATIONS 
The best approach to verify that the TMR was implemented properly in the FPGA 
by the Xilinx ISE software is to analyze the amount of logic being used by every design 
and that its functionality stays the same. The point of reference for this analysis is the 
original X1 and the benchmarks are the amount of logic included in each design and the 
evaluation of the functionality of FTX1. 
The configuration data for the XQVR600 FPGA is 3,608,000 bits [25]. This 
information is stored in registers distributed in the different components of the FPGA. 
Table 4 shows the estimated distribution of configuration bits. One important 
consideration for the evaluation of the FTX1 is that the amount of configuration data in 
the FPGA is the same no matter the design of FTX1. SEUs occurring in the configuration 
bits do not always produce a detectable error. The concern for the reliability of the FTX1 
is the configuration bits that if altered by a SEU will produce an error in the output data. 
The amount of logic being used by a FTX1 implementation determines the configuration 
bits susceptible to SEUs that will produce these hard errors. 
 
RESOURCE CONFIGURATION LATCHES PERCENTAGE 
CLB 103,086 0.35% 
IOB 2165 0.06% 
LUT 20409 5.61% 
BRAM 135,300 3.75% 
ROUTING 3,254,420 90.2% 
Table 4. Distribution of Configuration bits in the XQVR 600 (From Ref. [33]) 
 
The majority of the configuration bits are used for the control of the routing 
resources so, errors in the interconnections are more likely to happen than in the logic 
components [33]. 
1. Contol FPGA (X1) Resources 
The architecture of X1 was described in Chapter II. Table 5 shows the amount of 
logic actually used by every X1 component as is reported in the initial synthesis report. 
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Module FF Counter Add/Sub Comparator Mux FSM 
Top_level 11 4 --- 1 40 --- 
PC104Int 37 1 --- 2 --- --- 
X2Int 166 3 2 3 8 --- 
Selectmap_RB 138 --- 5 10 8 1 
Selectmap_Config 113 1 3 9 --- --- 
ClockGen 2 1 --- 2 --- --- 
TOTAL 467 10 10 27 56 1 
Table 5. X1 Resources by Module 
 
The synthesis report describes the amount of logic required by every component 
in order to implement its functionality as it is defined by the designer. But this logic can 
be optimized by the Xilinx ISE tools and the amount of logic used to physically 
implement a design can be much different that first reported. The final synthesis report 
given by Xilinx ISE contains the real amount of logic for the implementation of the 
design. Both numbers should be the same, but, since some optimization occurs in the 
synthesis process that can not be controlled, the amount of logic is simplified. This 
optimization does not affect the functionality of X1. Table 6 shows the amount of logic 
used in X1 reported in the final synthesis report. 
 
Resource Logic from Initial 
Synthesis report 




Finite State Machine (FSM) 1 1 0 
D-type Flip Flop 467 159 308 
Counter 10 6 4 
Adder/Subtractor 10 13 -3 
Comparator 27 27 0 
Multiplexor 56 8 44 




2. Fault Tolerant Contol FPGA (BFTX1) Resources 
The implementation of the BFTX1 is based on the TMR of instances of each 
component defined in top_level.vhd. The components being instantiated and triplicated 
by BTX1 are copies of the original X1 modules. In consequence the amount of resources 
used for each single component of BFTX1 is the same as X1 (Table 5). In addition to the 
X1 components and their triplicated instances, voters were included for the outputs of 
every triplicated module. The resources used by BFTX1 are shown in Table 7. The 
synthesis report contains the logic used by the components declared in BFTX1. Since the 
triplication in this case is on the instances, then just one component appears in the 
synthesis reports but in reality, when the FTX1 is configured in the FPGA, all triplicated 
instances are implemented and these resources appear in the final synthesis report. 
 
Module FF Counter Add/Sub Comparator Mux FSM 
Top_level 11 4 --- 1 40 --- 
PC104Int 37 1 --- 2 --- --- 
Voter_PC104Int 22 --- --- 6 --- --- 
X2Int 166 3 2 3 8 --- 
Voter_X2Int 16 --- --- 3 --- --- 
Selectmap_RB 138 --- 5 10 8 1 
Voter_SM_RB 47 --- --- 9 --- --- 
Selectmap_Config 113 1 3 9 --- --- 
Voter_SM_Config 46 --- --- 9 --- --- 
ClockGen 2 1 --- 2 --- --- 
Cg_volter 6 --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 1071 10 10 54 56 1 
Table 7. BFTX1 Resources by Module 
 
The reliability of BFTX1 is based on the successful triplication of the logic 
included in every component. If the optimization of the synthesis process reduces the 
TMR resources then the reliability of the design decreases. Table 8 illustrates the 
resources utilized for the implementation of BFTX1 as shown by the synthesis reports. 
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Finite State Machine (FSM) 1 1 0 
D-type Flip Flop 1071 566 505 
Counter 10 14 -4 
Adder/Subtractor 10 35 -25 
Comparator 54 106 -52 
Multiplexor 56 12 44 
Table 8. Synthesis Reports for BFTX1 
 
Given that the instances inside top_level.vhd are triplicated, it is obvious to 
observe an increment in the resources being used but some comments need to be made 
here. Given that the original components of X1 are simplified, the same thing is 
happening with BFTX1 components and the triplication of the resources of X1 is taking 
place at the level of the already simplified logic. 
3. Fault Tolerant Contol FPGA (MFTX1) Resources 
The MFTX1 is based on the triplication of the components of X1 (except top 
level) instead of the triplication of instances. This means that the simplification already 
seen in the components of the original X1 and BFTX1 is occurring here too. In the initial 
synthesis report the logic of each of the triplicated components is shown. Voters are 
included at the output of the triplicated components. Table 9 shows the amount of logic 
utilized by this design. 
 
Module FF Counter Add/Sub Comparator Mux FSM 
Top_level 11 4 --- 1 40 --- 
PC104IntArm1 37 1 --- 2 --- --- 
PC104IntArm2 37 1 --- 2 --- --- 
PC104IntArm3 37 1 --- 2 --- --- 
Voter_PC104Int 22 --- --- 6 --- --- 
X2Int1 166 3 2 3 8 --- 
X2Int2 166 3 2 3 8 --- 
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Module FF Counter Add/Sub Comparator Mux FSM 
X2Int3 166 3 2 3 8 --- 
Voter_X2Int 16 --- --- 3 --- --- 
Selectmap_RB1 138 --- 5 10 8 1 
Selectmap_RB2 138 --- 5 10 8 1 
Selectmap_RB3 138 --- 5 10 8 1 
Voter_SM_RB 47 --- --- 9 --- --- 
Selectmap_Config1 113 1 3 9 --- --- 
Selectmap_Config2 113 1 3 9 --- --- 
Selectmap_Config3 113 1 3 9 --- --- 
Voter_SM_Config 46 --- --- 9 --- --- 
ClockGen1 2 1 --- 2 --- --- 
ClockGen2 2 1 --- 2 --- --- 
ClockGen3 2 1 --- 2 --- --- 
Cg_volter 6 --- --- --- --- --- 
TOTAL 1516 22 30 106 88 3 
Table 9. MFTX1 Resources by Module 
 
Table 10 illustrates the difference between the resources reported in the initial and 
final synthesis reports. As can be seen, the initial reports from BFTX1 and MFTX1 are 
different but the amount of logic shown in the final reports is the same for both designs. 
This means that indeed the simplification from the initial to the final synthesis resources 
is a smart move and instead of deleting all replicated logic, the software is replacing some 
components by others or it is sharing resources between the different components, 
deleting the unnecessary resources. 
B. EVALUATION OF THE FTX1 IMPLEMENTATIONS THROUGH 
HARDWARE UTILIZATION 
The initial point of analysis is the original X1 design. This unit contained a certain 
amount of logic. Adders, subtractors, comparators and other components are generated 
whenever a process in X1 requires them and the different signals used by the unit are 
saved in registers. Then the synthesis tool determines which components can by deleted, 
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replaced or shared. One example is a signal that does not change values inside a module. 
This signal is initially saved in a register but once the synthesis tool recognizes that there 
is no change in the value of the signal, it replaces it with a value in a register to save 
resources. Another example is that instead of generating a 4-to-1 multiplexer for each 
process requiring one, the synthesis tool combines the functionality of small multiplexers 
and generates a larger one that simplifies the logic. So in reality, the simplification of 
resources tries to increase the performance of the design and to save resources for future 
utilization. Even though there is an unintentional simplification of resources, X1 has 
proved to be a functional and efficient component in the past but no reliability test had 
been applied on it. 
 






Finite State Machine (FSM) 1 1 0 
D-type Flip Flop 1516 566 1050 
Counter 22 14 8 
Adder/Subtractor 30 35 -5 
Comparator 106 106 0 
Multiplexor 88 12 76 
Table 10. Synthesis Reports for MFTX1 
 
The inconvenience is that components that need to be triplicated in order to 
implement a complete TMR are being simplified and there is no control about this 
process.  
Three different Fault Tolerant Control Units were proposed in Chapter V. 
3PFTX1 could not be implemented with the current CFTP hardware and its analysis is 
not addressed but it is worth mentioning that this is the ideal model to implement a 
complete TMR of the original X1. 
BFTX1 is the second implementation proposed. Its functionality and 
implementation was discussed in previous sections. The important point to mention in 
this analysis is that BFTX1 was produced from the TMR of instances of the original X1 
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components, and since these components are simplified by the Xilinx software before any 
triplication takes place, the same behavior is observed in BFTX1 components. Since 
simplification is happening at the original X1 components without control, the amount of 
simplification occurring in the BFTX1 is an unknown too. From Table 10 is evident that 
the original X1 is being triplicated. In fact, the instances being triplicated are based on the 
already simplified components. 
BFTX1 and MFTX1 have a lot in common. Their basic difference is that the first 
design bases its reliability in the TMR of the instantiation of components and the second 
design in the TMR of the components before being instantiated. The purpose of MFTX1 
was to determine if some un-intentioned simplification was occurring in the BFTX1 by 
comparing the resources utilized by both designs. The hypothesis was that since 
instantiations of the same component are being used in BFTX1, Xilinx ISE synthesis tool 
was smart enough to recognize the redundancy of the instances from the same component 
and in consequence simplified the design reducing the redundant resources and the 
reliability being added to FTX1. 
MFTX1 design triplicates the components instead of the instantiations. Table 11 
shows the resources used by the different FTX1 implementations. The amount of logic 
used in MFTX1 is basically three times more than the original X1 and pretty much the 
same as the BFTX1 approach.  
 
Resource X1 BFTX1 MFTX1 
Equivalent Gates 32,542 96,891 95,878 
Slices 815 (11%) 2418 (34%) 2332 (33%) 
Slice FFs 735 (5%) 2100 (15%) 2093 (15%) 
4-input LUTs 1354 (8%) 4060 (29%) 3952 (28%) 
IOBs 121 (72%) 121 (72%) 121 (72%) 
Table 11. Resources of FTX1 Implementations 
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The Xilinx FPGAs and the software tools used to program them have secrets. This 
hidden information limits the implementation of a complete TMR and the control over 
the optimization process of the logic being used by a design.  
The bottom line is that in the original X1 some simplification is occurring and the 
TMR implementations BFTX1 and MFTX1 are using these simplified components as 
replicated instances or redundant components. This proves that the TMR is being 
implemented properly and since the optimization of the original components of X1 does 
not degrade its functionality, the same fact can be expected in the FTX1 designs. 
C. EVALUATION OF FUNCTIONALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE 
FTX1 
Two of the basic requirements for the implementation of a Fault Tolerant system 
are that the functionality and performance of the original components stay the same or 
present only slight changes. In the previous section it was demonstrated that indeed the 
TMR is being properly implemented in both BFTX1 and MFTX1 designs. But this 
analysis is not enough to prove that the functionality and performance of the original X1 
do not suffer modifications. From Chapter III, the basic functions of X1 are:  
• Control of the initial configuration and subsequent reconfigurations of X2. 
• Interfacing with system memory (Flash and EEPROM). 
• Handling communication with the outside world trough a PC/104 bus. 
• Verification of the experiment running in X2 through scrubbing. 
In order to show that the FTX1 designs do not alter the original functionality of 
X1 each of the functions mentioned above needs to be verified. In Reference [55] the 
process of design and implementation of experiments on the CFTP board are explained. 
The best way to verify that the FTX1 designs work properly is to program the CFTP 
board using FTX1 instead of X1 and verify that the outputs of X2 are the same.  
The first step is programming X1 to write an experiment’s configuration to the 
flash memory. After this step is completed, a message is received from the CFTP 
informing that X1 was programmed successfully. The only function of this configuration 
is to load the flash memory and after this task is completed a new X1 configuration is 
loaded as explained in the following paragraphs. The period of time that this initial 
configuration of X1 is in use is short therefore fault tolerance is not implemented on it. 
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The second step in the process of programming the CFTP board consists of 
writing the configuration of an experiment to the flash.  
The third step consists of programming X2 with the configuration stored in the 
flash.  
The last step consists of programming X1 again. This configuration is the basis of 
the development of this work. If X1 is working properly, it must be able to read the 
configuration and the output of X2, pass that information to the PC/104 bus and read the 
original configuration from the flash. This X1 configuration works through all the 
operation of the CFTP until a new experiment needs to be loaded in X2. 
The evaluation of the operation of X1 is merely based on the analysis of the 
output of the experiment running on X2. If the output of X2 is the same for different 
configurations of X1, we can assume that indeed the functionality of X1 did not present 
any variation. 
Each design of X1 is related to one specific experiment running on X2 and every 
time a new experiment is loaded in X2, some modifications need to be done to the X1 
code. In this case, the experiment used with the FTX1 designs implemented in this work 
is a Multiplier developed by Gerald W. Caldwell [55].  
After the CFTP is in full operation X1 takes the outputs from the experiment 
running on X2 and sends that information to the PC/104 bus. This is the first point in the 
evaluation of X1. The next point is the evaluation of the correctness of the output from 
X2. 
A complete explanation of the design and operation of this multiplier is presented 
in Reference [55]. What has to be observed at the output of X2 is a sequence of 18 
hexadecimal numbers arranged in the following sequence: 
• The letter “E” (hex 45). 
• The letter “R” (hex 52). 
• A sequence of eight zeros. 
• The 2-digit output of a counter that provides the inputs to the multiplier. 
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• The 4-digit output of the multiplier that should be the square of the 
counter input. 
• A time stamp. 
The letters E, R and the sequence of zeros are constant in every output but the 
time stamp and the count of the multiplier vary. 
The output from X2 using the original X1 is shown in Figure 18. 
 
 








Figure 20.   Output from X2 through MFTX1 
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There is not a real difference from the point of view of functionality and resource 
utilization between BFTX1 and MFTX1. Although the automatic optimization and the 
TMR applied to the original X1, there is no modification in the functionality of the 
Control FPGA.  
Another way to verify the performance of the designs is through the timing report. 
The maximum frequency at which BFTX1 and MFTX1 can run is about 59.563 MHz and 
since the clock used by the CFTP no matter the X1 design used is 51 MHz there is no 
detriment in performance. 
D. MANUAL INJECTION OF ERRORS 
After proving that the BFTX1 and MFTX1 designs were implemented correctly in 
the Control FPGA and there is no change in functionality on the original X1, the next 
step was to test the designs for fault tolerance. 
The only method currently available for testing the FTX1 is the manual injection 
of errors. As explain in Chapter V, this method consists of the modification of one of the 
triplicated modules in such a way that its outputs differ from the outputs of the other two 
modules. 
The best way to implement the manual injection is to place inverters at the output 
of the faulty module (Figure 18). Consequently, these outputs are always different than 
the outputs of the other two modules. 
In the next step, the outputs coming from the triplicated modules are voted by a 
majority voter and the final output of the TMR is the correct value. 
This method is easy to realize and provides a better means for the evaluation of 
the FTX1 designs than just the evaluation of the correct implementation of TMR. Figure 




Figure 21.   Output from X2 through MFTX1 with Manual Injection of Errors 
 
Effects of SEUs over FPGAs were analyzed in previous chapters. One of the 
limitations of the manual injection of errors is that not all the SEUs’ effects can be 
simulated. In fact, only errors in logic components can be simulated since there is no 
current way to modify the configuration bits to test the FTX1 designs against 
configuration errors with the use of manual injection. 
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Figure 22.   Manual Injection of Errors in MFTX1 
 
Resource X1 BFTX1 BFTX1_Inj MFTX1 MFTX1_Inj
Equivalent Gates 32,502 96,891 95,987 95,878 96,673 
Slices 815 (11%) 2418 (34%) 2352 (34%) 2332 (33%) 2346 (33%) 
Slice FFs 735 (5%) 2100 (15%) 2098 (15%) 2093 (15%) 2087 (15%) 
4-input LUTs 1354 (8%) 4060 (29%) 3934 (29%) 3952 (28%) 4044 (29%) 
IOBs 121 (72%) 121 (72%) 121 (72%) 121 (72%) 121 (72%) 
Table 12. Resources of FTX1 Implementations with Manual Injection 
 
The resource utilization of BFTX1 and MFTX1 designs changed with the 
implementation of manual injection, but the changes were minor. Table 12 shows the 




E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, different implementations were evaluated from the hardware 
utilization point of view to prove that indeed the Xilinx ISE software implemented the 
TMR of the designs properly. An analysis of the outputs from X2 utilizing the different 
X1 designs and the testing of the FTX1 designs through manual injection of errors were 
also evaluated.  
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
This thesis described the effects of the space environment on electronics and 
specifically on FPGAs. The Fault Tolerant techniques applicable to FPGAs were then 
explained. Three different implementations of a Fault Tolerant Control Unit (FTX1) 
within an FPGA for space applications were proposed. Finally, an analysis of the way in 
which TMR is being implemented by the Xilinx tools, the analysis of functionality of the 
FTX1 designs and manual injection of errors to test the designs were presented. 
A. SUMMARY 
The harsh space environment represents a challenge for the implementation of 
computer systems for space applications. SEUs are the biggest concern when a SRAM-
based FPGA is a component of those systems. Circuit-Level and High-Level 
modification methods have been proposed for the mitigation of SEUs in FPGAs. TMR 
represents the most reliable technique to implement a Fault Tolerant Control Unit. Three 
different designs of a FTX1 were proposed: 3PFTX1, BFTX1 and MFTX1. All these 
designs are based on the TMR approach with slight variations.  
3PFTX1 represents the complete TMR of the original X1. This implementation 
consists in the triplication of the resources of X1 from inputs to outputs. By definition it 
is the only way to protect all the components of X1 including the configuration bits. The 
requirement of 3 pins per input and output signal was a restriction for the successful 
implementation of this design in the XQVR600-4CB228 FPGA. 
BFTX1 was then proposed to solve that limitation. This implementation is based 
on the triplication of instances of the different components of X1 except top level. In this 
design the TMR is not complete and there are single points of failure present given that 
the input and output signals and the UCF file can not be replicated. Some unintended 





MFTX1 was proposed to determine the source of the automatic optimization that 
the Xilinx tools apply to the TMR implementation. Components instead of instances were 
triplicated. The amount of resources utilized by BFTX1 was pretty much the same as the 
resources utilized in MFTX1 disproving the hypothesis that the triplication of instances 
was the cause of the optimization. 
An analysis of the files generated after the implementation of X1, BFTX1 and 
MFTX1 in the XQVR600-4CB228 showed that the unintentional optimization of 
resources was not a consequence of the redundancy of components but a consequence of 
the architecture of the original X1 components. Table 13 shows the resource utilization 
for each of the X1 implementations. 
 
Resource X1 BFTX1_Inj MFTX1_Inj 
Equivalent Gates 32,502 95,987 96,673 
Slices 815 (11%) 2352 (34%) 2346 (33%) 
Slice FFs 735 (5%) 2098 (15%) 2087 (15%) 
4-input LUTs 1354 (8%) 3934 (29%) 4044 (29%) 
IOBs 121 (72%) 121 (72%) 121 (72%) 
Table 13. Resources of FTX1 Implementations 
 
After proving that the FTX1 designs were implemented correctly in the CFTP 
board the next step was the evaluation of the functionality of these designs. It was done 
through the analysis of the outputs obtained from X2 utilizing each of X1 designs.  
Finally a testing through manual injection of errors was implemented. Even this is 
not an optimal evaluation technique it served as a starting point to prove that the TMR is 
working properly and that in fact the reliability of X1 is increased.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Different Fault Tolerant Techniques have been proposed for the implementation 
of designs based on SRAM FPGAs for space applications but the TMR is indeed the only 
method that completely protects these designs. 
75
3PFTX1 represents the ideal design of a Fault Tolerant Control Unit within an 
FPGA that is the objective of this work but the hardware of the CFTP board restricts its 
implementation. 
Given that a FTX1 with complete TMR is not an option for the current CFTP, 
BFTX1 and MFTX1 designs were proposed. These designs implement successfully a 
Fault Tolerant Control Unit through the triplication of most of the components of X1. 
Single points of failure are present in these designs and this can only be corrected through 
modifications in the hardware of the CFTP board. 
The automatic and un-intentional optimization implemented by Xilinx tools does 
not harm the functionality of X1 and the reliability provided by the triplication of the 
simplified components of X1. 
The FTX1 designs proved not to harm the functionality and performance of the 
original X1 that are basic requirements for the implementation of a Fault Tolerant 
System. 
It was proved through manual injection of errors that indeed the TMR improves 
the reliability of the Control FPGA. 
C. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
The complete implementation of TMR in the Fault Tolerant Control Unit is the 
only way to ensure that every component inside X1 including the configuration memory 
will be protected against SEUs. Modifications in the CFTP board and specifically, the 
replacement of the current XQVR600-4CB228 FPGA for one with three times more pins 
need to be done in order to implement a completely reliable X1. 
Both BFTX1 and MFTX1 designs triplicate all X1 components but the 
top_level.vhd module. This module could not be triplicated because of the lack of pins on 
the chip. A way to at least triplicate the functionality inside this module needs to be 
investigated. 
The evaluation of the designs proposed for the implementation of a FTX1 is based 
on the resources utilized by each design and the comparison of the outputs of X2 
controlled by them. The best approach to evaluate the improvement of the reliability of 
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X1 is through radiation testing of the device. It has to be accomplished with the purpose 
of calculating the effective cross section, the increment of sensitive bits to SEUs that 
produce a persistent error and the behavior and ability to detect and correct errors in each 
design. 
An additional hardware component (Anti-fuse FPGA) in the CFTP board or a 
C&DH with software tools need to be implemented in order to be able to scrub and inject 
errors inside the FTX1 as X1 does with X2. 
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